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HIS article provides an update of certain significant developmentsTin franchise law in Texas and in the Fifth Circuit during the Survey
period. This article also highlights cases involving dealerships and
distributorships that, in the authors' judgment, provide a relevant back-
drop for franchising. Of particular interest to the franchise practitioner
during this Survey period are cases dealing with a range of issues such as
jurisdiction connected to sales from internet sites, the enforceability of
arbitration clauses, parties' respective rights under the Petroleum Mar-
keting Practices Act (PMPA), and the enforceability of non-competition
covenants. In addressing the specific areas that affect franchise and dis-
tribution systems, this update has not attempted to explain the entire
body of franchise law but, instead, has focused on those Texas and Fifth
Circuit cases that are particularly instructive.
II. PROCEDURE
A. JURISDICTION
Courts continue to grapple with the issue of jurisdiction in internet
cases. A federal district court considered this issue in Carrot Bunch Co.
v. Computer Friends, Inc.' Carrot Bunch Companies filed suit against
Computer Friends, Carrots Inks and Jimmie Moglia in the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas for violations of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protec-
tion Act ("ACPA"), the Lanham Act, unfair competition,
misappropriation, and the Texas tort of Injury to Business Reputation or
Trade Name or Mark. 2 The plaintiff is a Texas corporation engaged in
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the business of selling ink jet cartridges. Computer Friends and Carrots
Inks are Oregon corporations owned by Moglia, an Oregon resident, and
are also engaged in the sale of ink cartridges. All three of the entities
have websites to market and sell their goods. Carrot Bunch sued defend-
ants because it alleged that they were improperly using a trademark that
belonged to it.3 Carrots Inks and Moglia moved to have the court dismiss
the claims against them arguing the absence of personal jurisdiction.
Computer Friends consented to jurisdiction. Alternatively, all of the de-
fendants moved to transfer the matter to a United States district court for
the district of Oregon.4
The court in this matter looked to the "clear Fifth Circuit standard for
assessing personal jurisdiction in Internet cases."'5 "In Mink v. AAAA
Development L.L.C.,6 the Fifth Circuit adopted the sliding scale test first
set forth in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc. to evaluate
the effects of a defendant's Internet activities" on the determination of
personal jurisdiction. 7
Zippo requires a court to look to the "nature and quality of commer-
cial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet."' 8 The court in
Zippo set forth three categories of activities. "The first category consists
of situations where a defendant does business over the Internet by enter-
ing into contracts with residents of other states by knowingly and repeat-
edly transmitting computer files over the Internet."9 Courts have held
that jurisdiction is proper in this situation.' 0
The second category "consists of situations where a defendant has a
website that allows a user to exchange information with a host com-
puter."' 1 Courts determine jurisdiction in these cases by looking at "the
level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of informa-
tion that occurs on the Web site."' 2 "The more interactive and commer-
cial the website is, the more likely it is that a court will find that the
minimum contacts requirement is met."'13
The third category "consists of situations where a defendant has merely
posted information on an Internet website which is accessible to out of
state users."'1 4 This contact is not sufficient to satisfy the minimum con-
tacts necessary to establish jurisdiction, because the nature of the infor-
mation "does not necessitate an interaction between the website and the
3. Id. at 823.
4. Id. at 822.
5. Id. at 824.
6. Mink v. AAAA Dev. L.L.C., 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999).
7. Carrott, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 824; see Mink, 190 F.3d at 336 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997)).










Carrots Inks sold products to Texas customers over the website and
sent them e-mail confirmations. The court held that Carrots Inks' opera-
tion of an interactive website to sell to Texas customers was of a type to
warrant jurisdiction over it in Texas. It also found that Moglia's inten-
tional direction of his tortious conduct toward a company in Texas, the
forum state, was sufficient to warrant jurisdiction in Texas.16 Therefore,
the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss or transfer venue.17
Autobahn Imports, Inc. v. BMW of North America, L.L. C.,18 involved a
franchisor's motion to dismiss or motion to abate proceedings pending
appeal of an administrative claim. Autobahn Imports, Inc., the fran-
chisee, became a franchise dealer for BMW of North America, L.L.C.
(BMW) in July 1992.19 In July 1999, BMW informed its dealers that in
order to sell and service BMW's new X5 Sports Activity Vehicles (X5
SAVs), being introduced that year, all dealers would have to sign a letter
of intent and execute a new dealer agreement. The franchisee "refused to
sign the letter of intent, claiming that the X5 SAV was covered under the
existing Dealer Agreement. '20 BMW informed the franchisee that it
would not receive any of the X5 SAVs.21
The franchisee then filed an administrative complaint pursuant to the
Texas Motor Vehicle Commission Code ("the Code"), alleging that BMW
had violated the Code in distributing the X5 SAVs in Texas. The Texas
Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Division ("the Board"),
notified BMW of the complaint and imposed a statutory stay precluding
BMW from violating the franchisee's rights under the existing Dealer
Agreement. BMW then delivered several X5 SAVs to the plaintiff's com-
petitors for promotion purposes and to take orders but failed to deliver
any to the franchisee, which the franchisee alleged violates the statutory
stay."'22 In late November 1999, an agreed Interim Order was issued in
the administrative action that ordered BMW to deliver new X5 SAVs to
all Texas BMW dealers who held franchises under the BMW dealer
agreement. In July 2001, "the Board issued a 'Final Order,' that found
that [BMW] had violated section 5.02 of the Code and prohibited BMW
from implementing a separate franchise agreement for the X5 SAV. 23"'
BMW filed a motion for rehearing, which the Board denied.24
After that, the franchisee filed a complaint against BMW in state court
alleging several causes of action, including violations of the Code, viola-
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 827.
18. Autobahn Imports, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., L.L.C., No. CIV-A 4:01-CY-926-Y,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9379, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 28, 2002).








tion of the automatic stay imposed by the Code, breach of the agreed
interim order, breach of the dealer agreement, breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing and recovery of attorneys' fees.2 5 BMW removed
the case to federal court. BMW filed a motion to dismiss or, alterna-
tively, a motion to abate, claiming that the plaintiff's claims were "either
premature or concern[ed] matters that fall within the exclusive or pri-
mary jurisdiction of the Board and [were] not properly before the
court."'2 6 BMW argued that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear
the case with respect to plaintiff's claims that were pursued before the
Board, because the Board had not yet issued a final order. 27 The court
found that the Board issued a final order on July 19, 2001, and that BMW
filed a motion for rehearing, which was denied on October 24, 2001.
Thus, "the Board's order became final on this date as the Board had de-
termined that [BMW] had violated some of the provisions of the Code. '28
This concluded the administrative process. BMW appealed the Board's
order to a state court in Travis County, Texas, pursuant to the Govern-
ment Code. BMW requested, as an alternative form of relief, that the
Court abate the case until BMW's appeal of the Board's decision in the
state court action was finalized,2 9 claiming that it was illogical and ineffi-
cient for the court to interpret the Code to allow a claim for damages
before a final, non-appealable order had been entered. The court agreed
and abated the action pending conclusion of the defendant's appeal in the
state court action. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to dismiss,
but granted the motion to abate.30
Subaru of America, Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc.31 involved the
interrelation between a trial court's original jurisdiction and the Board's
original jurisdiction under the Code.32 The plaintiff was the owner of an
Oldsmobile and a Subaru franchise. He wanted to move his dealerships
to a new location. Subaru's regional vice-president allegedly orally con-
sented to the relocation. The plaintiff moved his Oldsmobile franchise
and prepared to move the Subaru franchise next to it.33 Subaru then
wrote to the plaintiff and stated that it would not allow any Subaru fran-
chisee to move to that location. Consequently, the plaintiff terminated
his Subaru dealership. The next year, Subaru allowed another dealer to
move to a lot adjoining the plaintiff's proposed site. 34
The plaintiff sued Subaru for refusing to allow him to relocate and al-
leged that Subaru violated the Code provision that made it unlawful for a
25. Id. at *6.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at *11.
29. Id. at *13.
30. Id. at *11-14.
31. Subaru of America, Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2002)





manufacturer to unreasonably deny a dealership-relocation application. 35
Subaru filed a summary judgment motion, asserting that the plaintiff did
not raise these claims before the Board and, consequently, could not
bring these claims in court. The court granted Subaru's summary judg-
ment motion.36 On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of McDavid's Code claims and DTPA claims because they fell
within the court's exclusive jurisdiction, but the court remanded McDa-
vid's common law breach of oral contract claims for determination by the
trial court.37
The Supreme Court of Texas upheld the appellate court's jurisdictional
determinations. 38 The Code states that the Board has general and origi-
nal power and jurisdiction to regulate all aspects of the distribution, sale,
and leasing of motor vehicles.39 The Code's plain language, purposes,
and scheme convinced the court that the Legislature did not confer exclu-
sive jurisdiction on the Board over all issues or disputes related to motor
vehicle sales and distribution. 40 Rather, the Board has exclusive jurisdic-
tion over only those issues expressly identified in the Code as exclusively
within the Board's purview.41 In this case, the parties had not raised any
issues over which the Board had exclusive jurisdiction.
In making these determinations, the Texas Supreme Court considered
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.42 This doctrine arises when a plain-
tiff seeks a remedy in court and the issue or claim also falls within a regu-
latory scheme's subject matter.43 The doctrine presumes that concurrent
jurisdiction over an issue exists between the courts and the agency at is-
sue except where the governing statute specifically provides the agency
with exclusive jurisdiction.44
B. ARBITRATION
Texas courts have written opinions during the Survey period regarding
motions to compel arbitration, motions to stay underlying actions pend-
ing arbitration, and the ability to arbitrate certain claims under the par-
ties' agreements.
In Gary Barber v. Gloria Jean's Gourmet Coffees Franchising Corp.,45
the franchisee entered into a franchise license agreement and a store de-
velopment agreement with its franchisor for the purchase and operation
35. Id.
36. Id. at 218.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 227-28.
39. Id. at 223.
40. Id. at 223-24.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 220-21.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Gary Barber v. Gloria Jean's Gourmet Coffees Franchising Corp., No. CIV.A 3:01-
CV-1027-P, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 630, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2002).
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of a coffee store in Texas.46 The agreements contained arbitration clauses
and forum selection clauses. 47 The franchisee alleged that in connection
with the negotiations of the agreements, the franchisor, or its agents,
failed to disclose or misrepresented certain matters which were intended
to and did induce them to enter into the transactions. 48 The franchisee
filed suit under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protec-
tion Act (DTPA) and for breach of contract. The franchisor removed the
case to federal court, answered on the merits, and sought to stay judicial
proceedings in favor of arbitration some three months after commence-
ment of suit.49 Rejecting the franchisee's claim of waiver, the court held
that the franchisor's conduct did not "constitute an invocation of the judi-
cial process sufficient to effect a waiver of [its] right to arbitrate" under
the agreement. 50 The franchisee also argued that the franchisor's choice
of the California forum discouraged the litigation of valid claims by fran-
chisees and, in the alternative, the agreement itself was unfair because of
the unequal bargaining power of the parties. Because the franchisee
failed to offer any proof to support his allegations, however, the court
rejected this argument and stayed the case pending arbitration.51
In Sharju Limited Partnership v. Choice Hotels International, Inc.,52 an-
other Texas district court granted a franchisor's motion to compel arbitra-
tion. This dispute arose out of a hotel franchisee's claim that Choice
Hotels tortiously interfered with its contract to sell its franchised hotel to
a third party. The franchisee claimed that Choice Hotels intentionally
misrepresented the franchisee's ability to convey certain hotel properties
to the third party, thus prompting the third party to abandon the sale.5 3
Allegedly, Choice Hotels misrepresented the franchisee's compliance
with a provision of the franchise agreement that provided Choice Hotels
the right of first refusal. In response to these claims, Choice Hotels
moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the written arbitration clause in
the franchise agreement. 54 The court held that the arbitration clause was
enforceable and reasoned that "the success or failure of Sharju's tortious
interference claims depend[ed], as a legal matter, on whether the parties
complied with the terms of the Franchise Agreement. '55 Since it was the
performance or non-performance of a specific contractual duty created
by the franchise agreement that formed a condition precedent to the
maintenance of the franchisee's tort claim, the arbitration provision
46. Id. at *2.
47. Id. at *34.
48. Id. at *2.
49. Id. at *2-3.
50. Id. at *9.
51. Id. at *15.
52. Sharju Ltd. P'ship v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., No. Civ.A 3:01-CV-2605-X, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1074, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2002).
53. Id. at *2.
54. Id. at *4.
55. Id. at *7.
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would govern that tort claim and was the ultimate issue in the case.56 The
court reasoned that because Sharju's allegations were so interwoven with
the provisions of the Franchise Agreement that its tortious interference
claim cannot be maintained without reference to the contract, they fell
within the scope of the arbitration clause.57 As a result, the court stayed
the lawsuit pending completion of the arbitration.
In Cash America International, Inc. v. Exchange Services, Inc.,58 the
franchisor of a check cashing business and the guarantor of the franchise
agreement sought to arbitrate their disputes with the franchisee. Mr.
Payroll Corporation, the franchisor, and Exchange Services, Inc., the
franchisee, executed an amended and restated franchise agreement to be
effective July 31, 2000. Cash America International, Inc. executed the
agreement as guarantor. Under the agreement, if the franchisee did not
operate the business in which a check-cashing facility was located, then
the franchisor was required to lease or sublease the facility Location and
in turn sublease its Location rights to the franchisee.5 9 The franchise
agreement required arbitration of "any and all" disputes with the
franchisor and guarantor.60 The court of appeals rejected the franchisee's
two main arguments: (1) the landlord was a necessary party to the pro-
ceeding and could not be forced to arbitrate; and (2) it was proceeding
only under lease documents that contained no arbitration clause. 61 The
court determined that if a party to a valid arbitration agreement could
effectively negate the agreement by filing suit and joining into the suit
any necessary or proper party who had not agreed to arbitrate, then
agreements to arbitrate disputes would be, practically speaking, illusory.
The court noted that the plain, unambiguous language of the arbitration
provision before the court provided for arbitration of all disputes be-
tween the franchisee and the franchisor with specific exceptions for ac-
tions with regard to ownership or use of Proprietary Marks or fees to be
paid under a specified section of the franchise Agreement. 62 The court
concluded that the dispute was within the scope of the arbitration
provision. 63
In Investment Partners, L.P. v. Glamour Shots Licensing, Inc., the Fifth
Circuit was presented with the question of "whether an arbitration clause
that prevents the award of punitive damages proscribes antitrust treble
damages and whether, if so, the arbitration clause is void as against public
policy."' 64 The court affirmed the district court's decision that statutory
treble damages were not equivalent to "punitive damages," that the arbi-
56. Id.
57. Id. at *8.
58. Cash America Int'l, Inc. v. Exch. Serv., Inc., 83 S.W.3d 183 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
2002, no pet.).
59. Id. at 184.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 186.
62. Id. at 187.
63. Id.
64. Inv. Partners, L.P. v. Glamour Shots Licensing, Inc., 298 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2002).
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tration clause was enforceable, and that the parties were required to
arbitrate. 65
III. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP, TERMINATION
AND NON-RENEWAL
A. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP
Although franchisees and franchisors must comply with the Texas Busi-
ness Opportunity Act, which protects businesses from false, misleading,
or deceptive practices in the sale or lease of a business opportunity, Texas
does not have a franchise specific relationship law. 66 Therefore, franchis-
ees will allege, in addition to general contract claims, antitrust violations
and other statutory causes of action that can possibly be construed to
apply to the franchise relationship in an attempt to take advantage of
more severe penalties. The Petroleum Marketing Practices Act
("PMPA") often used in this manner, is a federal statutory scheme cre-
ated to regulate the termination and non-renewal of petroleum franchise
relationships.67
In Shell v. Shell Oil Co.,68 franchisees of Shell-branded gasoline sta-
tions in California, Texas, and New York brought suit against the
franchisor, Shell Oil Co., claiming that the requirement that the franchis-
ees execute new agreements, accompanied by the threat that their
franchises would not be renewed if they did not, constituted a construc-
tive termination of the franchise relationship in violation of the PMPA.
Section 2802(a) of the PMPA prohibits termination or nonrenewal of
franchises unless the notification requirements of the PMPA are met and
the termination or nonrenewal is based on specified grounds.69
The correspondence at issue included a retail facility lease, a retail sales
agreement, and a cover letter to the franchisees. 70 The cover letter stated
that "if you do not sign and return the Lease and other enclosed docu-
ments in a timely manner, be advised that Equilon will issue without fur-
ther warning a non-rescindable notice of non-renewal pursuant to the
terms of the [PMPA]. ' '71
The plaintiffs in this matter were composed of franchisees who had re-
ceived the correspondence and those who would receive it in the future.
72
They claimed that the PMPA contemplated a claim for constructive ter-
mination and that the franchisor's actions in this matter violated those
provisions of the PMPA. 73
65. Id. at 315, 318.
66. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §§ 41.001-.303 (Vernon 2002).
67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2841 (2000).
68. Shell v. Shell Oil Co., 216 F. Supp. 2d 634 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(a) (2000).






Under the PMPA, one of the reasons a franchisor may refuse to renew
a franchise is that the franchisee refuses to agree to changes or additions
to a new franchise agreement.74 Two conditions must be met, however:
(i) such changes or additions are the result of determinations made
by the franchisor in good faith and in the normal course of business,
and (ii) such failure is not the result of the franchisor's insistence
upon such changes or additions for the purpose of converting the
[facility] to an operation by employees or agents of the franchisor for
the benefit of the franchisor or otherwise preventing the renewal on
the franchise relationship. 75
The court held that the franchisee-plaintiffs who had not received the
agreements and cover letter did not have a cause of action because they
were merely anticipating termination, but had not been threatened with
it.76 With regard to the plaintiffs who actually received the cover letter,
the court held that the provisions of the PMPA did not support a claim
for construction termination. 77 In doing so, the court reasoned that the
PMPA provides a statutory remedy to insure that independent service
station franchisees are not the victims of arbitrary and discriminatory ter-
mination and that statutory framework alleviates the necessity for any
construction termination claim. 78
The court further noted that the danger with having a constructive ter-
mination theory in this situation is that a franchisee that is still operating
profitably could render a claim for damages for alleged termination even
if they suffered little or no injury.79 The court determined that this was
not a reasonable interpretation of the statute and declined "to recognize
a constructive termination theory where the franchisor had given no defi-
nite notice of termination or non-renewal pursuant to § 2804, and the
franchise relationship is ongoing."80
B. TERMINATION AND NON-RENEWAL
As with most relationships, the most sensitive and difficult part of the
franchise relationship is ending it. In Exxon Corp. v. Mahmoud,81 Exxon
appealed the trial court's decision that it wrongfully terminated a service
station franchise agreement with one of its service station owners. 82 It
was undisputed that Mahmoud had shown that Exxon terminated the
franchise; therefore, the burden shifted to the franchisor to establish that
the termination was proper under the PMPA.83 The PMPA requires ter-
74. Id. at 636 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(A) (2000)).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 639.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 641.
80. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2804 (2000)).
81. Exxon Corp. v. Mahmoud, No. 05-00-01927-Cu (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 25, 2001)
(not designated for publication), 2002 WL 92867.
82. Id. at *1.
83. Id. at *2; 15 U.S.C. § 2805(c) (2000).
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mination to be based on a ground set out in the PMPA. 84 One such
ground for termination is that the franchisee breached a term of the
franchise agreement that is both reasonable and of material significance
to the franchise relationship. 85
The majority of the court's opinion was dedicated to evaluating which
term of the franchise agreement the franchisee was accused of violating.
Exxon asserted that Mahmoud used unscrupulous and unethical business
practices in his business dealings related to a franchise not the subject of
this litigation. 86 Exxon further asserted that Mahmoud's questionable
business dealings were a violation of the public confidence provision of
the franchise agreement which stated that "while displaying EXXON
identification and offering products for sale, DEALER will: (D) Conduct
DEALER'S business in a fair, scrupulous and ethical manner. '8 7
The court found, however, that the provision was clearly directed to the
promotion and sale of Exxon products to its customers, and there was no
evidence that Mahmoud displayed Exxon identification and offered Ex-
xon products for sale while committing any of the allegedly unethical and
unscrupulous activity. 88 Thus, the court held that Exxon failed to conclu-
sively establish that its termination of Mahmoud's franchise was justified




In Pizza Hut, Inc. v. White,90 the court considered Pizza Hut's applica-
tion for a temporary restraining order and motion for preliminary injunc-
tion and the defendant's motion to compel arbitration. Pizza Hut sought
an injunction and other relief to enjoin franchisee White "from continu-
ing to operate his restaurants using Pizza Hut's trademarks, trade names,
logos, designs, and business and merchandising systems." 9' Under the
franchise agreement between parties, White was authorized during the
effective period of the agreement to utilize the Pizza Hut trademarks. 92
The parties entered into that agreement February 26, 1990.93
By letter dated February 20, 2002, Pizza Hut notified White that he was
in default under the terms of the Franchise Agreement.94 White failed to
84. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b) (2000).
85. Id. at § 2802(b)(2)(A).
86. Exxon, 2002 WL 92867, at *1.
87. Id. at *2.
88. Id. at *4.
89. Id.
90. Pizza Hut, Inc. v. White, No. Civ.A 3:02-CV-0790-L, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19930,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2002).
91. Id.





cure the default and his franchise agreement was ultimately terminated.95
Pizza Hut alleged, and White did not dispute, that White continued to
operate his business under the Pizza Hut license system even though the
franchise agreement had been terminated. 96
To prevail on a motion for preliminary injunction, a movant must es-
tablish that (1) "there is a substantial likelihood that [it] would prevail on
all the merits; (2) there is a substantial threat that irreparable harm will
result if the injunction is not granted; (3) the threatened injury outweighs
the threatened harm to the defendant;" and (4) a preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order will not disserve the public interest.97
Although many infringement cases are predicated on the defendant's
use of marks so similar to that of the plaintiff that the public will mistake
the defendant's product for those of the plaintiff, the Fifth Circuit has
also recognized that "falsely suggesting affiliation with the trademark
owner in a manner likely to cause confusion as to source or sponsorship
constitutes infringement." 98 The court held that White's continued use of
the Pizza Hut marks after the termination of the franchise agreement was
likely to cause confusion between White's products and those of author-
ized Pizza Hut franchisees. 99 The court found that White's use of the
marks gave the false impression or false suggestion that White's restau-
rant was sponsored by and affiliated with Pizza Hut.100 Accordingly, the
court held that Pizza Hut satisfied the first prong of the requirements to
obtain injunctive relief.10 1 The court further held that in a trademark in-
fringement case, "a substantial likelihood of confusion constitutes irrepa-
rable injury.' 02
The court found in Pizza Hut's favor on the remaining factors as well:
that Pizza Hut's harm would outweigh the threatened harm to White and
that no disservice to the public interest would result from the granting of
an injunction in Pizza Hut's favor. 10 3 Because Pizza Hut satisfied all of
the requisite factors for injunctive relief, the court issued a preliminary
injunction. 104
In Dial One of the Mid-South, Inc. v. Bellsouth Telecommunications,
Inc.,105 a case cited in last year's Survey, the franchisor of the Dial One
95. Id.
96. Id. at *4.
97. Clarke v. Pritchard, 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987); Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489
F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
98. Prof'l Golfers' Assoc. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 514 F.2d 665, 670 (5th Cir. 1975).
99. Pizza Hut, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19930, at *9.
100. Id.; Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1492 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Common
sense compels the conclusion that a strong risk of consumer confusion arises when a termi-
nated franchisee continues to use the former franchisor's trademarks.").
101. Pizza Hut, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19930, at *9.
102. Id. at *10 (quoting Ramada Franchisee Sys., Inc. v. Jacobcart, Inc., No. CIV.A3:01-
CV-0306-D, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6650 (N.D. Tex. May 17, 2001)).
103. Pizza Hut, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19930, at *11-12.
104. Id. at *13.
105. Dial One of the Mid-South, Inc. v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., 269 F.3d
523 (5th Cir. 2001).
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plumbing and heating service business and two of its existing franchisees
brought suit under the Lanham Act 10 6 against the publishers of a local
telephone directory on the basis that the publishers' failure to remove an
incorrect telephone listing for a former Dial One franchisee constituted
infringement of the Dial One trademark.
The franchisor had terminated franchisee U.A. Durr in January 1998,
and notified the publishers of the Yellow Pages and White Pages for
southeastern Louisiana. 10 7 The defendant publishers nonetheless listed
Durr as a franchisee of Dial One in the May 1998, edition of the Yellow
pages and the October 1998, edition of the White pages.' 08
The trial court entered judgment for the franchisor and its franchisees
and awarded damages, but the defendant publishers appealed on grounds
that the trial court erred in not applying an actual malice standard to the
innocent infringer defense under §1114(2) of the Lanham Act. 109 The
innocent infringer defense "limits persons bringing actions under
§§1114(1) and 1125(a) to injunctive relief if the defendant is an innocent
infringer."'" 0 The defendant publishers contended that the trial court
erred in using a standard of objective reasonableness to review their con-
duct and determine their status as innocent infringers.1 I1 Under the stan-
dard of objective reasonableness, a defendant is an innocent infringer
only if his or her conduct is reasonable, regardless of state of mind.' 12
The United States district court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held
that the publishers' actions in failing to remove the incorrect listings were
not objectively reasonable.' 1 3
The Fifth Circuit looked to the language of the statute' 14 and noted
that:
[o]n its face, "innocent infringer" suggests a party who is without
blame, but also may connote one who is without knowledge of a
wrong or who has no improper motive. The latter interpretation sug-
gests an unremarkable legal scheme whereunder any "infringer" will
be held accountable, but an "innocent infringer" will not be subject
to as stiff a penalty. Our task is to determine the legal significance of
the term "innocent."1 15
Noting that the issue was one of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, the
court held that the objective reasonableness standard is the proper stan-
dard for evaluating whether an infringer is innocent.'1 6 The Fifth Circuit
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).
107. Dial One, 269 F.3d at 525.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 15 U.S.C. §1114(2) (2000).
111. Dial One, 269 F.3d at 525-26.
112. Id. at 525.
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993) (holding the best evidence
of this intent is the language of the statute)).
115. Dial One, 269 F.3d at 525-26.
116. Id. at 526.
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rejected the publishers' attempt to link their speech to the protection of
the Constitution and found there was no constitutional mandate to pro-
tect the publishers' type of speech under the heightened actual malice
standard, that certain inconsistencies in the legislative history were not
probative and most importantly, "the logic of the actual malice standard
is not appropriate in this context. 1 17
The Fifth Circuit focused on the United States Supreme Court holding
that matters not of public concern are not judged under the actual malice
standard n1 8 in finding that, "[a]lthough the trademark at issue in this case
was certainly a matter of public consumption, the improper listing of a
service repair business is hardly a matter of public concern such that the
improper listing should be protected." 119 The Fifth Circuit went even fur-
ther to state that the pubic interest is best served by the lesser objective
reasonableness test "to promote accuracy in this type of speech." 120
2. Cybersquatting
In Texas, the victims of cybersquatters have in the past relied on the
injunctive relief available under the Texas Anti-Dilution Statute.12' The
Texas Anti-Dilution Statute permits a party to enjoin an act that is likely
to dilute the distinctive quality of a registered or otherwise protectable
mark.122 The party must prove ownership of the mark and a likelihood of
dilution.123 In November of 1999, Congress passed the Anti-Cybersquat-
ting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA") 124 which offers additional pro-
tections and enforcement tools for traditional trademark infringement
claims under the Lanham Act,' 25 federal126 or state trademark dilution
statutes, 127 and common law unfair competition doctrines.
The ACPA provides for civil liability to the owner of a mark in circum-
stances where it is determined the registrant:
(1) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a per-
sonal name which is protected as a mark under this section; and (2)
registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name, [which], in the case of a
mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of the domain
name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark, [or, in] the case
of a famous mark that is famous at the time of registration of the
domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that
mark. 128
117. Id.
118. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1989).
119. Dial One, 269 F.3d at 527.
120. Id.
121. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (Vernon 2002).
122. Id.
123. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1513, 1514 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
125. Id. at § 1114(1).
126. Id. at § 1125(c).
127. Tex. Bus. & Corn. Code Ann. § 16.29.
128. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d)(1)(A), § 1129 (2000).
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In E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd.,129 the Fifth Circuit consid-
ered the summary judgment granted by the district court for the Southern
District of Texas that awarded damages and injunctive relief to E. & J.
because Spider Webs had registered the domain name "ernestandjulio-
gallo.com" in bad faith and in violation of the ACPA.130 Spider Webs
appealed the ruling claiming that it did not act with a "bad faith intent" to
profit as required by the ACPA.13'
After considering several factors, including the fact that (1) Spider
Webs bought over 2,000 famous domain names with the express intent to
resell them to the companies that would have an interest in using them;
(2) Spider Webs did not begin to use the domain name until after the
litigation began; (3) E. & J.'s mark was well known in the marketplace;
and (4) Spider Webs sought to capitalize on E. & J.'s good will, the court
found that Spider Webs had acted in bad faith. 132 Therefore, it upheld
the district court's ruling of the transfer of the domain name and the
award of damages. 133
In Goldstein v. Gordon,134 the district court considered the issue of ju-
risdiction with regard to a domain name under the ACPA. On January 2,
1998, Philip Alexander Gordon registered the name "cheaters.com" with
an internet domain name registrar and database company. 135 On January
6, 2000, plaintiff Robert Goldstein filed suit against Gordon claiming that
he had engaged in unfair competition under the Lanham Act by taking
illegal ownership of and illegally using the domain name "www.cheaters.
com." 136 The District Court issued a summons to Gordon at an address
in Canada, but the summons was never served. 37
Goldstein was unable to locate Gordon. He amended his complaint to
add the domain name itself as a defendant.1 38 Goldstein urged the court
to proceed against the domain name in rem pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d)(2)(A). 139 Goldstein later filed a motion for a finding of no per-
sonal jurisdiction over defendant Phillip Alexander Gordon.140 In the
motion, Goldstein requested that the court find that service was proper
on the domain name because he could not obtain personal jurisdiction
over Gordon. 41 The court granted the motion.142 Subsequently, the
court granted a default judgment against cheaters.com and in favor of
129. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2002).
130. Id. at 273.
131. Id. at 274.
132. Id. at 275-77.
133. Id.
134. Goldstein v. Gordon, No. Civ. A 3:00-CV-0022-P, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3348, at
*1 (N.D. Tex. Feb 27, 2002).
135. Id. at *2.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *3.
139. Id.
140. Id. at *4.
141. Id. at *4-5.
142. Id. at *5.
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Goldstein. 143 Nine months after the motion for default was granted,
cheaters.com moved to set aside the default judgment because the court
lacked personal and in rem jurisdiction. 44
Cheaters.com claimed the default judgment was void. 145 The two fac-
tors used by the court to determine voidness are "(1) whether the court
lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties or (2) if the court
acted in a manner inconsistent with due process.' 1 46 The court examined
the ACPA provisions upon which the default judgment was based, 147 and
in particular, the provisions that address when a plaintiff can file an in
rem action against the mark.148 The court found that "the ACPA pro-
vides for in rem jurisdiction against a domain name only in those circum-
stances where in personam jurisdiction is not available or where the
individual defendant cannot be located after a diligent effort. '149 Courts
have also held that a plaintiff must prove that the individual defendant is
not subject to "in personam jurisdiction ... in any judicial district in the
United States."'150
The Goldstein court ruled that Goldstein failed to establish that
Gordon "was not subject to in personam jurisdiction in any judicial dis-
trict in the United States.' 151 In doing so, the court noted that in one of
Goldstein's pleadings, he listed a California address for Gordon on the
certificate, which turned out to be the address at which Gordon could
have been reached. 152 Since Goldstein could have obtained personal ju-
risdiction over Gordon, the court ruled Goldstein could not maintain an
in rem action against cheaters.com and the default judgment was void. 153
As a result, the court set aside the default judgment against
cheaters.com. 154
Also noteworthy is the fact that the court also granted sanctions against
Goldstein for his misrepresentations to the court regarding his attempts
and inability to serve Gordon. 155
V. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
A. CONTRACT ISSUES
In Haase v. Glazner,1 56 the Texas Supreme Court held that a contract
143. Id.
144. Id. at *5-6.
145. Id. at *5.
146. Id. (citing Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1006 (5th Cir. 1998)).
147. Id. at *8.
148. Id.
149. Id. at *9.
150. Id. (citing Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome. Corn., 106 F. Supp. 2d 860, 867
(E.D. Va. 2000)).
151. Id. at *11.
152. Id.
153. Id. at *4.
154. Id. at *19.
155. Id. at *27.
156. Haase v. Glazner, 62 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. 2002).
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to sell a franchise was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds and
could not support a fraud or fraudulent inducement claim.157 Glazner
worked for Haase at a Whataburger. Haase promised to sell his franchise
to Glazner. The negotiations were set forth in three letters that were sent
to Whataburger. Whataburger never granted a franchise to Glazner.
Glazner sued Haase alleging breach of contract, fraud, fraudulent induce-
ment and unjust enrichment. 15 8 Haase moved for summary judgment,
which the trial court granted. On appeal, the court affirmed the summary
judgment on all claims except those for fraud and fraudulent induce-
ment.159 On the fraudulent inducement claim, the Texas Supreme Court
reversed and held, that without a contract, there could be no claim that a
party was fraudulently induced to enter into a contract. 160 On the fraud
claim, the court held that, to the extent Glazer sought to recover the ben-
efit of the bargain of a contract that was unenforceable under the Statute
of Frauds, the statute bars the claim.' 6' The court did find that any claim
for out-of-pocket damages was extra-contractual and would survive the
Statute of Frauds.
B. VICARIous LIABILITY
In Khan v. Shell Oil Co.,162 an automobile service station attendant
brought claims against the service station franchisor for negligent failure
to maintain a safe work place as a result of injuries sustained when Khan
was shot during an armed robbery at the Shell service station where he
worked. 163 Reversing the trial court's summary judgment, the court held
that a fact question existed concerning whether security-related matters,
over which the franchisor had the right to exercise control, played a part
in the shooting or the robbery during which the attendant was shot.164
The court noted that the terms of the station lease and dealership agree-
ment supported the position that the franchisor had a right to control the
security-related matters at the station and, therefore, had a duty to pro-
vide a safe work place for the employee. 65 Indeed, the contracts re-
quired the franchisee to obtain the franchisor's permission before
installing new lights for greater illumination, installing bullet proof glass,
or even putting up a sign that announced minimal cash on hand. 166 Simi-
larly, the franchisee needed the franchisor's permission before installing a
security camera. 167 Furthermore, the court reasoned that, although the
franchisee had to request the franchisor's permission to make certain
157. Id. at 796.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 797.
160. Id. at 798.
161. Id. at 798-99.
162. Khan v. Shell Oil Co., 71 S.W.3d 890 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. granted).
163. Id. at 891-92.
164. Id. at 894.
165. Id. at 892-93.




changes related to security, the franchisor had the power to step in at any
time and make security-related changes itself.168
C. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
In Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co.,' 69 a Ford dealer wished to sell its dealer-
ship to another party. The dealership's agreement with Ford, however,
granted Ford a right of first refusal with respect to the dealership and the
land on which it operated. 70 Butnaru, the prospective buyer of the deal-
ership, sued Ford, for tortious interference and injunctive relief claiming
that by invoking its right of first refusal, Ford tortiously interfered with its
purchase and sale agreements with the dealer, in violation of the Code.' 7'
The trial court granted the injunctive relief requested.17 2 On appeal,
Ford argued that this was a simple breach of contract case, and injunctive
relief was not proper.1 73 Upholding the trial court's decision granting a
temporary injunction using an abuse of discretion standard, the court
held that property and dealership were unique, and even though the sale
was the subject of a contract, the fact that it involved a piece of land was
sufficient to warrant injunctive relief.1 74
In Apani Southwest, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc., 75 a bottled
beverage seller brought antitrust, tortious interference, and civil conspir-
acy claims against a competitor which had entered into an exclusive sup-
ply arrangement with the City of Lubbock, Texas.176 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed the court's dismissal of the seller's tortious interference claims,
holding that Apani failed to present sufficient evidence that the actions of
Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc. ("CCE") were unlawful or independently
tortious, which are two essential elements of claims based on tortious in-
terference with an existing business relationship or tortious interference
with a prospective business relationship. 177
VI. STATUTORY CLAIMS
A. TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES-
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
In Subaru of America, Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 7 8 Subaru
filed suit against David McDavid Nissan, Inc. ("McDavid") for violating
the Code, the DTPA and for breach of contract and the duty of good faith
168. Id.
169. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2002).




174. Id. at 210-12.
175. Apani Southwest, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enterp., Inc., 300 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2002).
176. Id. at 623-24.
177. Id. at 634.
178. Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2002).
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and fair dealing.179 McDavid alleged that Subaru gave oral permission to
relocate a dealership, but after relocation began, denied the permis-
sion.180 McDavid also alleged that after it closed its dealership, Subaru
allowed another dealership to relocate next to the proposed spot.' 8 Dur-
ing the pendency of the claim, the Texas Legislature amended the Code
to provide for the exclusive jurisdiction over Code related claims with the
Board.182 As a result, the Texas Supreme Court held that the Code-based
claims (DTPA, bad faith and breach of oral contract) were remanded to
the trial court, which was ordered to abate its proceeding until the dealer
exhausted the administrative remedies provided for in the Code. 83
B. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
1. Noncompetition Agreement Not Enforced
In Total Car Franchising Corp. v. Esh,184 the plaintiff, Total Car
Franchising Corporation ("TCFC"), filed suit against David Esh ("Esh")
and Perfect Appearance, Inc. ("PAI") alleging breach of a noncompeti-
tion agreement, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of the cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing, as well as violations of Texas and
Georgia trade secrets acts.185 TCFC entered into a franchise contract
with Esh on behalf of PAI for mobile paint restoration for automobiles,
certain types of watercraft and aircraft under the franchise agreement . 86
TCFC granted PAI a franchise with a territory that consisted of four au-
tomobile dealerships in Atlanta, Georgia.1 87 Less than two years after
the franchise agreement was executed, Esh notified TCFC that he would
be terminating his franchise.' 88 Two months later, however, Esh notified
TCFC that he wished to rescind his franchise termination and transfer his
franchise to Dallas, Texas, and Esh moved to Dallas.' 89 Esh and TCFC
never modified the franchise contract in writing to reflect a transfer of the
franchise to Dallas.190
Once in Dallas, Esh worked for TCFC but was ultimately terminated
due to a compensation dispute. 19' Esh retained the accounts he had ob-
tained while working for TCFC in Dallas and sought to compete with
TCFC in the Dallas area.' 92 TCFC sought a preliminary injunction to
179. Id. at 217.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 219.
183. Id. at 228.
184. Total Car Franchising Corp. v. Esh, No. 3:02-CV-0141-R, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22148, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2002).




189. Id. at *2-3
190. Id. at *3.
191. Id.
192. Id. at *1-2.
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prohibit Esh from competing against TCFC in the Dallas-Ft. Worth met-
ropolitan area. 193 The United States magistrate judge held that TCFC
failed to present evidence of irreparable harm and, thus, TCFC failed to
provide evidence of one of the seminal elements of an injunction
action.194
C. ANTITRUST
In Apani Southwest, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc.,195 the Fifth Cir-
cuit upheld a trial court's dismissal of antitrust, tortious interference, and
civil conspiracy claims due to the plaintiff's failure to establish essential
elements of the claims plead. Apani is a manufacturer of bottled water
operating in and around Lubbock, Texas. Apani had a relationship with
the city that allowed Apani to sell its product in the facilities owned by
the city.196 In 1999, the city entered into an exclusive contractual agree-
ment with CCE allowing CCE to supply non-alcoholic beverages to facili-
ties owned and operated by the city.1 97 Apani sued, asserting claims
under the Clayton Act, the Sherman Act, and the Texas Free Enterprise
and Antitrust Act of 1983, Texas Business and Commerce Code section
15.01. In addressing the antitrust claims, the court focused on the re-
quirement under all of the acts to define the relevant geographic mar-
ket.1 98 Affirming the district court's dismissal, the court held that Apani
failed to allege a relevant geographic market, and the alleged market "did
not correspond to the commercial realities of the industry." 199
D. THE TEXAS BUSINESS AND COMMERCE CODE
In Mathis v. Exxon Corp.,200 the court analyzed the plaintiffs' claims
under the Texas analogue of the Uniform Commercial Code-Sales
(UCC). 20 "The franchisees originally filed Sherman Act, Clayton Act,
and [PMPA] claims against Exxon in addition to the breach of contract
claim. The antitrust claims were abandoned and the district court granted
Exxon judgment as a matter of law on the PMPA claims. '20 2
Plaintiffs argued that Exxon had set the dealer tank wagon ("DTW")
gasoline price at an uncompetitive level to drive them out of business, in
order to replace their stores with company owned stores. Exxon argued
that, "because it charged its franchisees a DTW price comparable to that
charged by its competitors, the breach of contract claim was precluded as
193. Id.
194. Id. at *7.
195. Apani Southwest, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enterp., Inc., 300 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2002).
196. Id. at 623.
197. Id. at 624.
198. Id. at 625-26.
199. Id. at 633.





a matter of law."'20 3 The court spent a large portion of its opinion analyz-
ing the meaning of the term "good faith" throughout the UCC,204 even
citing the history of comments to the UCC and the background discus-
sions from the editorial board.20 5 The court determined that it was re-
quired to "examine the content of the duty of subjective good faith," even
though no Texas or Fifth Circuit case [had] squarely addressed the mean-
ing of the good faith clause of § 2.305" (the open price provision) of the
Texas Business & Commerce Code. 206
The court determined that Exxon's bad faith was shown by the re-
cord.207 The court stated that because of "competition of self-service sta-
tions that were either selling food and other goods or had bare pumps
with no overhead costs incurred in serving vehicles, Exxon decided years
ago that retail marketing through franchise dealers was becoming eco-
nomically unsound.1208 "Although Exxon had decided to move to [com-
pany operated retail stores] in Houston and to use jobbers in Corpus
Christi, this decision was not communicated to its franchisees. '20 9 "Be-
cause of profit from their other sales, [company operated retail stores]
could, and did, sell gas for less than the franchise dealers paid Exxon for
their gas."' 210 And even though "jobbers delivered Exxon gas to their
dealers for less than Exxon franchisees were required to pay for their
delivered gas,... Exxon prohibited franchisees from buying at this lower
price from the jobbers."121' The court stated that "[t]he loss of competi-
tive position and profit to plaintiff franchisees was inevitable and fore-
seeable to Exxon.1212 The court held that the "jury's finding that Exxon
breached its duty of good faith in setting the DTW price it charged the
plaintiffs [was] not without foundation in the law or the evidence" and
affirmed the jury verdict. 213
VII. REMEDIES: DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
During the Survey period, the Dallas Court of Appeals reduced an ac-
tual damages award from $7.367 million to $1.667 million, finding that the
evidence was insufficient to support the jury's award of actual dam-
ages.2 14 In Shell Oil Products Co. v. Main Street Ventures, L.L.C.,215 a
203. Id. at 453.
204. Id. at 453-59.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 458.







214. Shell Oil Prods. Co. v. Main St. Ventures, L.L.C., 90 S.W.3d 375 (Tex. App.-




gasoline station development company brought suit against Shell's pro-
duction and marketing company for breach of contract, negligent misrep-
resentation, and fraud arising from the parties plans to develop a retail
business concept that combined fast-food courts with gas stations. After
finding in favor of the plaintiff, Main Street, on its breach of contract,
fraud, and negligent misrepresentation claims, the jury further found:
Main Street (1) spent $1.7 million of its own money in reliance on
promises or representations made by Shell, (2) lost $4 million from
turning down opportunities to sell interests in Main Street in reliance
on promises or representations made by Shell, and (3) was unable to
pay $1.667 million in debts as a result of Shell's conduct.216
Shell challenged the jury's damage award on appeal on four "no evi-
dence" grounds: (1) Main Street was not the appropriate entity to recover
damages, as it was formed after some of the alleged losses; (2) Main
Street was not entitled to recover the $1.7 million allegedly spent in reli-
ance on promises, as the funds were expended by other entities and there
was insufficient evidence of reliance; (3) the $4 million loss from turning
down the opportunity to sell was not foreseeable and directly traceable to
the fraud; and, (4) there was insufficient evidence to support finding that
Main Street was unable to pay its debts as a result of Shell's conduct. 217
First, with regard to Main Street's ability to recover damages, Shell con-
tended that Main Street was not entitled to recover money allegedly
spent in reliance on the relationship, as the Main Street entity was not
formed until after the funds were spent.218 The court disagreed and de-
termined that the fact that Main Street was formed after the money was
spent did not necessarily preclude the recovery of damages.21 9 Further,
the court found there was evidence that the entities expending funds were
"wholly owned subsidiaries of Main Street and that their assets were to
be included in the joint venture through Main Street as the holding
company." 220
Second, Shell challenged the sufficiency of the evidence that the $1.7
million was spent in reliance on representations by Shell. The Court of
Appeals reversed this award of damages finding that, at best, the evi-
dence showed only the money Main Street claimed was put into the food
court/gas station concept as its own contribution to the joint venture and
216. Id. at 383. In addition, the jury found "Main Street's lost $2.2 million as the fore-
seeable value of its forty percent interest in the joint venture as of September 1, 1997." Id.
at 380. Main Street elected to recover under its fraud claim but declined the jury's $2.2
million award under this cause of action to avoid any duplicative recovery." Id. at 380-81.
217. Id. at 383-86. "When analyzing a legal sufficiency or 'no evidence' issue, we con-
sider the evidence in a light most favorable to the challenged finding, disregarding all evi-
dence and inferences to the contrary." (citing Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex.
2001)). "If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the evidence is
legally sufficient and the no evidence challenge must fail." (citing Formosa Plastics Corp.
USA v. Presidio Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1998)).





had no connection to representations by Shell. 221
Third, Shell challenged the recovery of consequential damages in the
form of a $4 million loss from turning down opportunities to sell interest
in Main Street to others.2 22 Under Texas common law, a party is entitled
to recover consequential damages when such damages are reasonable and
directly traceable to and result from the fraud.2 23 On appeal, Main Street
and Shell agreed that $4 million dollars was the value of the offer to
purchase received by Main Street; however, Shell argued that the $4 mil-
lion funding offer was not evidence of the value of the damages or loss
suffered by Main Street. Based upon an opinion out of the Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of New York, Main Street argued that it
was not required to offer evidence of the "net benefit" it lost by relying
upon misrepresentations by Shell. 224 According to Main Street, in In re
Coin Phones, Inc,.225 the bankruptcy judge used the exact dollar amount
of a proposed capital infusion to determine the company's value, regard-
less of the fact that a large portion of the infusion would be used to pay
the company's outstanding debt. The Dallas Court of Appeals, however,
distinguished the Coin Phones decision from the present case, as Main
Street had failed to present any evidence as to how the $4 million would
have been used. Moreover, the court reasoned that even if it assumed the
money would be used for new stores, there was no evidence as to how
many stores would be built or what the value of these stores would have
been. Thus, the court held that there was no evidence that Main Street
suffered $4 million in damages by merely turning down the funding offer
and reversing the jury's award of $4 million in damages.
In the fourth challenge, Shell argued that there was no evidence to sup-
port an award of consequential damages based upon Main Street's inabil-
ity to pay $1.667 million in debts.226 The court found Main Street was
only required to prove that its inability to pay its debts was a "natural,
probable, and foreseeable consequence of Shell's conduct. 12 27 Because
there was evidence that Main Street was responsible for the debts, and its
inability to pay them was caused by Shell's conduct, the award of $1.667
million in actual damages was upheld. As a result of these rulings and
substantial reduction of Main Street's actual damages, the award of ex-
emplary damages was reformed to two times the remaining actual dam-
221. Id. at 384. The damages claimed included items such as the seed money and money
used to purchase the first location which was bought several months before negotiations
with Shell.
222. Id.
223. Id. (citing Formosa Plastics Corp., 960 S.W.2d at 49 n.1) ("When properly pleaded
and proved, consequential damages that are foreseeable and directly traceable to the fraud
and result from it might be recoverable.").
224. Id. at 385.
225. In re Coin Phones, Inc., 203 B.R. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 189 F.3d 460 (2d Cir.
1999).
226. Shell Oil Prods., 90 S.W.3d at 385.
227. Id. at 386.
1756 [Vol. 56
FRANCHISE LAW
ages for a total of $3.334 million.2 28
Quite often the damages that are recoverable for a cause of action vary
depending upon the applicability of certain affirmative defenses. This
very issue was addressed by the Texas Supreme Court in Haase v.
Glazner,22 9 when asked to decide "whether a party can maintain a claim
based on either fraud or fraudulent inducement when that claim is pre-
mised on a contract that the Statute of Frauds makes unenforceable. '2 30
In Haase, the court held that a plaintiff could not assert a fraudulent in-
ducement claim when the contract that was allegedly induced was unen-
forceable due to the Statute of Frauds.231 In light of this ruling, the Texas
Supreme Court further held that due to the application of the Statute of
Frauds, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover "benefit of the bargain"
damages on its fraud claim, but that a fraud claim based upon "out-of-
pocket" damages may survive.2 32
The dispute in Haase v. Glazner, involved a claim by Glazner, a former
employee of Haase, who owned the Whataburger franchise for the City
of Longview, Texas. More specifically, Glazner alleged that he and
Haase had entered into a contract whereby Haase would allow Glazner
to build an additional Whataburger in Haase's franchise area, and upon
Haase's retirement he would sell his restaurants to Glazner.233 In addi-
tion, Glazner agreed that if he ever decided to sell his future
Whataburger restaurant, he would sell it to Haase.2 34 During the time
period of Glazner's employment, Whataburger did not grant any new
franchises. After Glazner quit working for Haase, Haase opened a new
Whataburger location in the area Glazner contended was his. Glazner
then brought suit for breach of contact, fraudulent inducement, fraud,
and unjust enrichment. 235
Following the affirmation of the trial court's ruling that Glazner's
claims for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement were barred by
the Statute of Frauds, the court addressed whether the surviving fraud
claim was still viable under such circumstances.2 36 The court then ana-
lyzed what, if any, damages may be recovered by Glazner.237 The court
recognized that "although economic losses may be recoverable under ei-
ther fraud or fraudulent inducement," its prior holding in Formosa Plas-
tics "should not be construed to say that fraud and fraudulent inducement
are interchangeable with respect to the measure of damages that would
228. Id. (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008(b)(1)(A) (Vernon Supp.
2002)).
229. Haase v. Glazner, 62 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. 2002).
230. Id. at 796.
231. Id. at 800.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 796.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 796-97.




be recoverable. '238 Thus, the court opined that "nothing in Formosa
Plastics prevents the Statute of Frauds from precluding a fraud claim that
seeks to recover the benefit of an unenforceable bargain." 239
The court had previously considered a similar issue in Nagle v. Nagle240
wherein the court found that enforcing an oral promise to convey land
under a fraud claim would render the Statute of Frauds meaningless.241
The court found that the same reasoning held true on Glazner's fraud
claim. To the extent that Glazner sought to recover the benefit of the
unenforceable bargain, awarding such damages would deprive the Statute
of Frauds of any effect.242 The purpose of preventing the enforcement of
an agreement, which is not reduced to writing as required, would be frus-
trated if a party could use a fraud cause of action to enforce the alleged
contract. On the other hand, "Glazner's fraud claim would not contra-
vene the Statute of Frauds to the extent that he seeks out-of-pocket dam-
ages incurred in relying upon Haase's alleged misrepresentations. '243
The record on appeal showed that Glazner had made efforts concerning
demographics, d6cor, potential profits and location, as well as hired a sur-
veyor and entered into an earnest money contract for a site on which he
proposed to build his restaurant. 244 The court stated that these kinds of
damages are not part of the benefit of any alleged bargain between the
parties and may be recovered as out-of-pocket damages. 245
Further, in a legal malpractice action by a franchisee against his former
attorneys, the Beaumont Court of Appeals re-visited the issue of the
franchisee's alleged damages in the underlying dispute with the
franchisor. 246 Because the Fifth Circuit in the underlying case concluded
that the franchisee,2 47 Yankee, presented no credible evidence to support
the jury's finding of damages, at issue in the malpractice lawsuit was
whether the franchisee had in fact suffered any recoverable damages that
his counsel failed to prove. 248 The only evidence of damages offered was
in the form of an affidavit by the principal of the franchisee. Under Texas
law, "an owner of property is qualified to testify about the market value
of his property;" however, the testimony must show not only his knowl-
edge of the market value, but also show that it is based on more than his
238. Id.
239. Id. at 779 (stating that statute of frauds was not at issue in Formosa Plastics and
thus the court had no occasion to consider its possible effect on a fraud claim premised on
an unenforceable contract).
240. Nagle v. Nagle, 633 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1982).
241. Haase, 62 S.W.3d at 799.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 799-800.
245. Id. at 800.
246. Nelson v. Dykeman, No. 09-01-226CV (Tex. App.-Beaumont April 11, 2002, pet.
denied) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 538811.
247. The underlying opinion by the Fifth Circuit is reported at Yankee Enters., Inc. v.
Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 121 F.3d 703 (5th Cir. 1997).
248. Nelson, 2002 WL 538811, at "1.
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own conclusory statements.249 The court concluded that the franchisee's
bare assertion that he received no benefit from his franchise agreement
with Dunkin' Donuts revealed no underlying fact upon which to support
his damage opinion.250 Thus, the court upheld the summary judgment in
favor of the law firm.25'
Finally, in addition to compensatory damages, the award of attorneys'
fees and costs to the prevailing party in any litigation involving interpre-
tation of provisions of a franchise agreement are fairly common.252 In
the past year, in Mathis v. Exxon Corp. ,253 the Fifth Circuit further clari-
fied the applicable law in determining whether to award fees and the rea-
sonableness of such fees.2 5 4 It is the general rule that a fee award is
governed by the same law that serves as the rule of the decision for the
substantive issues in the case.2 55 Until recently, the Fifth Circuit had re-
served the question of whether Texas or federal law governed review of
the reasonableness of the award.256 The court in Mathis explicitly held
that "state law controls both the award of and the reasonableness of fees
awarded where state law supplies the rule of decision. '257 Thus, in the
application of this rule in a federal court suit based upon a breach of
contract claim, when a federal court applies state law to the substantive
issues of the case, state law rather than federal law controls both the
award of and reasonableness of fees awarded. 258
Under the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provisions for at-
torneys' fees, there is a presumption of reasonableness for fees that are
"usual" or "customary. ' 259 Further, the judge is permitted "to take judi-
cial notice of the usual and customary fees and the contents of the case
file."'260 In the Mathis case, plaintiffs supported their request for attor-
neys' fees with an affidavit by lead counsel as well as an affidavit by an
attorneys' fees expert.26 1 The Fifth Circuit held that "under Texas law,
the two affidavits, combined with the presumption of reasonableness and
the court's ability to use judicial notice, .. . [was enough] to conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees" to the
prevailing plaintiff.262
249. Id. at *5 (citing Porras v. Craig, 675 S.W.2d 503, 504(Tex. 1981)).
250. Id. at *5-6.
251. Id. at *6.
252. Under Texas law, when a prevailing party in a breach of contract suit seeks fees, an
award of reasonable attorneys' fees is mandatory, as long as, there is proof of reasonable
fees and the plaintiff has been awarded damages. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 38.001(8) (Vernon 2002).
253. Mathis, 393 F.3d at 448.
254. Id. at 461.
255. Kona Tech. Corp. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 225 F.3d 595, 614 (5th Cir. 2000).
256. Mathis, 393 F.3d at 461 (citing Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Chevron Pipe Line Co.,
205 F.3d 222, 232 (5th Cir. 2000)).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 461-62.
259. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 38.003 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
260. Id.





In Investment Partners, L.P. v. Glamour Shots Licensing, Inc.,263 the
question presented to the Fifth Circuit was "whether an arbitration clause
that prevents the award of 'punitive damages' proscribes antitrust treble
damages and whether, if so, the arbitration clause is void as against public
policy."'264 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision that statutory treble damages are not equivalent to punitive
damages, and the clause was enforceable.265 In distinguishing between
punitive damages and statutory treble damages, the court recognized that
the purpose of such forms of recovery are different. While punitive dam-
ages are intended to punish a wrongdoer, treble statutory damages are
intended to compensate an injured party.266 The court recognized a fur-
ther distinction between the two forms of damages in that "punitive dam-
ages are awarded under notoriously open-ended legal standards and a
broadly defined constitutional limit concerning the amount awarded....
[whereas] treble damages represent a mere mathematical expansion of
the actual damages calculated by the [jury, judge or] arbitrator. '267 Be-
cause of these distinctions, and even though treble damages may indeed
be punitive, the court held such damages were not prohibited under the
arbitration provision.268
C. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
During the Survey period, both Texas federal and state courts issued
opinions evaluating requests by franchisors and franchisees for injunctive
relief. In Urgent Gear Inc. v. Savoia,269 a franchisor brought suit seeking
a preliminary injunction preventing a competitor from violating its trade
dress rights.270 More specifically, Urgent Gear alleged that Savoia's at-
tempts to sell look-alike products at a substantial price discount consti-
tuted trade dress infringement under the Lanham Act.271 The district
court granted Urgent Gear's application for a preliminary injunction
preventing Savoia "from selling, marketing, or distributing clothing prod-
ucts that infringe Urgent Gear's trade dress rights. '272
263. Inv. Partners, L.P. v. Glamour Shots Licensing, Inc., 298 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2002).
264. Id. at 315.
265. Id. at 318.
266. Id. at 317 (relying upon Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 635-36 (1985)).
267. Id. at 317-18.
268. Id. at 318 (finding that simply because treble damages exceed the actual damages
that may have been inflicted on a plaintiff they are not "punitive" for the purpose of inter-
preting the scope of an arbitration clause).
269. Urgent Gear, Inc. v. Savoia, No. 3:01-CV-2190-D (N.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2001) (not
designated for publication), 2001 WL 1577395.
270. Id. at *1.
271. Id. at *2 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000)).
272. Id. at *5.
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In reaching this opinion, the court analyzed the four federal common
law elements which must be established in order to obtain a preliminary
injunction:
(1) a substantial likelihood that it will prevail on the merits, (2) a
substantial threat that it will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction
is not granted, (3) that the threatened injury to it outweighs the
threatened harm the injunction may do to the defendants, and (4)
that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public
interest.273
In addressing the first element, the court analyzed whether Urgent Gear's
product trade dress qualifies for protection under the Lanham Act and, if
protected, whether the trade dress is being infringed.2 74 Urgent Gear
showed a likelihood of success on its Lanham Act claim, as the court
found that "Urgent Gear's trade dress was arbitrary, not generic, and
comprise[d] many unique features such as packaging artwork, a slogan on
packaging lettering, and the flag logo. '275 Further, the court found that
with the exception of the factors of "actual confusion and identity of ad-
vertising media," the eight factors evaluated for a finding of a likelihood
of confusion were significantly in favor of Urgent Gear; thus, Urgent
Gear met its burden of proving a likelihood of success on the merits of its
Lanham Act claim.27 6
With regard to the second element, the likelihood of confusion shown
between Urgent Gear's products and Savoia's products was sufficient to
show a threat of irreparable injury, particularly during the Christmas holi-
day season.277 Next, the court found that the potential injury of not pro-
viding relief to Urgent Gear outweighed any potential damage to Savoia,
as Savoia presented no evidence on this element and Urgent Gear
273. Id. at *1. Notably, in the opinion Judge Fitzwater cites many of his own prior
opinions as precedents, including the following cited to establish the right to a preliminary
injunction: Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713, 718 (N.D. Tex.) (Fitzwater, J.) (citing Rus-
citto v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1349, 1353 (N.D. Tex.)
(Fitzwater, J.), affd, 948 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)), affd, 244 F.3d 134 (5th
Cir. 2000) (per curiam); cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1062 (2001).
274. Savgia, 2001 WL 1577395, at *2 (stating that court would consider whether defend-
ants are using the same or similar trade dress that is likely to confuse consumers).
275. Id. The court's inquiry encompassed the issues of functionality, distinctiveness,
and secondary meaning. (citing Blue Bell Bio-Med v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1256
(5th Cir. 1989)). If the trade dress is non-functional, it qualifies for protection if it is either
inherently distinctive or has acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning. (citing
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992)). Because Urgent Gear's
trade dress involves artwork and design which are not functional parts of the clothing, the
Trade Dress claims of Urgent Gear were treated as non-functional. Id.
276. Id. at *3.
In Sunbeam Products, the Fifth Circuit held the following factors relevant to
this inquiry: (1) similarity of the two products; (2) identity of retail outlets
and purchasers; (3) identity of advertising media; (4) strength of the mark or
trade dress; (5) intent of the alleged infringing parties; (6) similarity of de-
sign; (7) actual confusion; and (8) degree of care employed by consumers.
Id. at *3 (citing Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 257 (5th Cir.
1997)).
277. Urgent Gear, 2001 WL 1477395, at *4.
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showed considerable amounts of money spent marketing its clothing
line.278 Finally, the court held that there was no evidence that the entry
of a preliminary injunction would disserve the public interest, as the in-
junction promoted the protection of valuable trademarks and service
marks in a capital based economy.279 Therefore, the court issued the re-
quested preliminary injunction.
In a very recent opinion, the district court for the Northern District of
Texas, Dallas Division, entered a similar preliminary injunction in favor
of the franchisor, Pizza Hut, Inc., against a terminated franchisee. 280
Pizza Hut sought injunctive relief to enjoin a recently terminated twenty-
year franchisee, White, "from continuing to operate his restaurant using
Pizza Hut's trademarks, trade names, logos, designs, and business and
merchandising systems" (the Pizza Hut Marks and System).281 The court
applied the four part test described above in determining whether the
requested relief was proper. 282
In addressing the first prerequisite, a likelihood of success on the mer-
its, the court found there was a "substantial likelihood that Pizza Hut will
be able to establish that it properly terminated the parties' agreement
based on [the franchisee's] failure to satisfy his financial obligations. '283
Despite the termination of the franchise agreement, the franchisee con-
tinued to use the Pizza Hut Marks and System without Pizza Hut's con-
sent.2 84 The court thus determined that such a situation constituted a
trademark infringement due to the likelihood of confusion for which the
franchisee presented no legitimate defense.285 Accordingly, Pizza Hut
was able to establish "a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of
its claim for trademark infringement. '286
Pizza Hut met the second element required for injunctive relief by es-
tablishing that the terminated franchisee's "continued use of the Pizza
Hut Marks and System, together with an inability and lack of incentive to
meet Pizza Hut's quality control standards, constitute[ed] a substantial
threat of irreparable injury to Pizza Hut. '287 Next, the court found that
the balance of hardships weighed in favor of Pizza Hut. The court con-
278. Id. at *5.
279. Id.
280. Pizza Hut, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19930, at *1.
281. Id.
282. Id. at *5 (citing Canal Authority v. Calloway, 489 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1974) (en
banc) (setting forth the Fifth Circuit prerequisites for granting injunctive relief)).
283. Id. at *6. Despite the fact that the franchisee contended he did not receive the
notice of default giving him a right to cure, the franchisee admitted that he received the
termination notice that was sent to the same address.
284. Id. at *8.
285. Id. at *9 (relying upon Burger King Corp., 710 F.2d at 1492 (holding "common
sense compels the conclusion that a strong risk of consumer confusion arises when a termi-
nated franchisee continues to use the former franchisor's trademarks")).
286. Id. at *9.
287. Id. at *10 (finding that where a likelihood of confusion exists, the lack of control
over the quality of the good constitutes immediate and irreparable harm regardless of the
actual quality of the defendant's goods).
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cluded that the terminated franchisee's twenty years experience with
Pizza Hut would allow him to make a livelihood despite the preliminary
injunction, and any potential harm was outweighed by the threatened
harm to Pizza Hut.28 8 Finally, the public interest factor weighed in favor
of the preliminary injunction by finding that "the public has an interest in
knowing when a franchisee is no longer affiliated with or sponsored by a
franchisor so that consumers may make informed decisions about the
goods and services they purchase. '289 Because all four factors weighed in
favor of Pizza Hut, the court entered the requested temporary injunction.
In addition to these cases, during the Survey period, the district court
for the Southern District of Texas provided some guidance regarding the
injunctive remedies available for violations of the PMPA. 290 Although
the court found that the franchisor's threats not to renew if its franchisees
did not agree to terms of its retail facility leases did not violate the
PMPA, the court described the available remedies as allowing both a civil
action for damages and injunctive relief to stop an attempted termina-
tion.291  More specifically, under section 2804(a) of the PMPA,
"franchisors are required to provide a 90-day notice to a franchisee of
termination or non-renewal of the franchise relationship. ' 292 During this
ninety-day time period, "the franchisee may seek injunctive relief to stop
the termination. '293 Thus, "because a franchisor cannot terminate with-
out providing the requisite notice, threats of termination unaccompanied
by explicit notice pursuant to § 2804" does not allow the franchisee to
seek an injunction.294 Only after the section 2804 notice is given, does
the franchisee have protection under section 2805.295
Texas state common law provides for three specific elements for a tem-
porary injunction: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a prob-
able right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable imminent and
irreplaceable injury in the interim.296 In Maples v. Muscletech, Inc.,297 the
enjoined party sought an interlocutory appeal on the trial court's order,
288. Id.
289. Id. at *12. The court further recognized that in a capital economy, the public has
an interest in promoting and protecting valuable trademarks (citing Ramada Franchise Sys.
Inc. v. Jacobcart, Inc., No. CIV.A. 3:01-CV-0306-D (N.D. Tex. May 17, 2001) (not desig-
nated for publication), U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6650. The Ramada opinion is discussed in the
2002 SMU Law Review Franchise Update. Deborah S. Coldwell, Robert A. Lauer, Clay
M. Steely & Julia Wommack Mann, Franchise Law, 55 SMU L. REV. 1075, 1107-1108
(2002).
290. Shell v. Shell Oil Co., 216 F. Supp. 2d 634 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
291. Id. at 639-640.
292. 15 U.S.C. § 2804(a) (2000).
293. Id. § 2805(b) (2000).
294. See Shell, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 640 (stating that because the legislative history
showed that Congress was aware of the use of threats but did not include any language in
the statute regarding coercive use of termination by threat, a simple threat to terminate is
not enough to invoke the protections afforded a franchisee).
295. Id. at 642.
296. Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex. 1993); Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 424
S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex. 1968).




and asked the appellate court to stay the temporary injunction pending
the appeal.298 "The basis of their request [was] that the bond set by the
trial court [was] inadequate to protect [Maples] from the potential dam-
age they would suffer if ... the injunction was improperly granted. '2 99
The dispute involved a licensing agreement between Maples and Mus-
cletech, Inc. whereby Maples was given the right to conduct retail sales
business under the name Muscletech; however, the agreement contained
a non-competition provision preventing a variety of activities upon termi-
nation.300 Following termination, Muscletech sought an injunction to en-
force the non-competition provisions of the licensing agreement. The
trial court granted the injunction and set a bond of $5,000.00.301 As part
of the appeal process, Maples sought relief in the form of a stay against
the enforcement of the preliminary injunction, arguing that the minimum
amount of the bond should be $100,000.00.302 The appellate court
"granted a temporary stay of enforcement of the injunction pending a
hearing on the motion. ' 30 3 Thereafter, the court issued an opinion deny-
ing the motion to stay, as the court concluded that Maples failed to estab-
lish that the potential damage to be suffered due to the injunction
exceeded the amount of the bond set by the trial court.304
The first argument addressed by the court was whether Maples had
waived the right to seek a stay under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
29.2, because the record did not show that Maples first sought a stay in
the trial court proceeding. 30 5 The court of appeals held that Texas Rule
of Appellate Procedure 29.2 did not contain a mandate requiring such
relief to first be sought from the trial court. 30 6
Next, the court considered the issue of the adequacy of the bond. "The
determination of the adequacy of the bond set by the trial court ... is to
be made on a case-by-case basis" and is reviewed on an abuse of discre-
tion standard, which prohibits the appellate court from disturbing the rul-
ings of the trial court absent evidence of abuse of discretion. 30 7 The court
questioned what evidence must be presented in support of a motion for a
temporary stay as the parties failed to present any authority on the is-
298. Id. at 429-30.
299. Id. at 430.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 431. The determination of the adequacy of the bond set by the trial court in
instances such as this one is to be made on a case by case basis based upon the record
before the reviewing court. (citing Stone v. Griffin Communications & Sec. Sys., Inc., 53
S.W.3d 687, 696 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2001, no pet. h.)). The bond for a temporary injunction
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and will only be modified upon a showing of
abuse of discretion. Id. at 431.
303. Id. at 430.
304. Id. at 432.
305. Id. at 431.
306. Id. (stating that Rule 29.2 provides only that the appellate court may not act "if
the appellant's rights would be adequately protected by supersedeas").
307. Id. at 431 (relying upon an analogous case, Lamar Boilers, Inc. v. Guardian Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 786 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ)).
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sue. 30 8 Thus, the court relied upon an analogous case which also recog-
nized a lack of precedental authority and concluded that to obtain
temporary orders under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43, "a mo-
vant must make a clear showing that it is entitled to relief... by stating
the relief sought, the basis for the relief, and setting forth the facts neces-
sary to establish a right to the relief sought. 309
Given this standard set by the court, it then evaluated Maples' evi-
dence that the bond was insufficient. The court held that Maples' sole
evidence that gross revenues for the store was $25,000.00 a month was
insufficient because it did not take into consideration necessary expenses
incident to operating the store.310 The court determined that Maples had
the burden of proof to produce evidence of the actual anticipated losses,
and without proof of such, there was no adequate basis on which to con-
clude that the trial court abused its discretion. 311 The court reasoned that
if a showing of expected gross revenues was deemed sufficient, then the
court would have to either ignore common knowledge and assume the
store would have no expenses, or wrongfully place the burden of proof on
the non-movant. 312
As a final note, the opinion of the Texas Supreme Court in one of the
cases cited in the 2001 update has been withdrawn with a new opinion
issued in its place. On June 27, 2002, the Texas Supreme Court withdrew
its prior opinion in Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co. 313 and issued a new opin-
ion. The change in the opinion was based upon a legislative change to
section 3.01(a) of the Code. 314 This statutory change did not affect the
court's analysis as to the temporary injunction, and therefore the analysis
of this case on the issue of the temporary injunction remains the same.315
308. Id.
309. Id. (citing Lamar Boilers, 786 S.W.2d at 791).
310. Id. at 431-32.
311. Id. at 432.
312. Id.
313. Butraru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2002). The prior withdrawn opin-
ion was reported at 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 808 (Tex. 2001).
314. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4413 (36) § 3.01(a) (Vernon 2002).
315. See Coldwell, supra note 289, at 1109-10.
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